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INNOVATIONS IN PUBLIC UTILITY ACCOUNTING
REGULATION
E. W. MOREHOUSEt
A NEW D .AL in public utility accounting control has been in the mak-
ing during the past five years. During 1936, the movement reached its
peak with six new or revised systems of accounts1 prescribed, recom-
mended, enacted and even tested in the courts. Four of them were or-
dered by federal regulatory agencies; but the state commissions initiated
and sponsored many of the novel principles in two of the federal systems.
Their point of view is represented in the systems of accounts for electric
and gas utilities recommended by the National Association of Railroad
and Utilities Commissioners in November, 1936, a significant recom-
mendation despite the fact that it was nominally made after the Federal
Power Commission had prescribed a substantially identical system of
accounts for electric utilities under its jurisdiction. A system of accounts
for telephone utilities was ordered by the Federal Communications Com-
mission late in 1935 but restraining orders or temporary injunctions
made it inoperative until December 7, 1936, when the Supreme Court
upheld the accounting system as constitutional.2 And the Securities and
Exchange Commission has prescribed two new systems of accounts, one
for mutual service companies and the other for holding companies.
It has long been recognized by forward-looking commissions that
chapter one of effective regulation begins with accurate, revealing, and
uniform accounts and accounting statements. Unless a commission has
readily available for quick use the information needed to perform its
duties, it is hobbled at the start of any investigation. One of the chief
criticisms of commission regulation of public utilities is a characteristic
f Chief, Rates and Research Division, Public Service Commission of Vri'consi.
The writer gratefully acknowledges the helpful advice and assistance of Judge Alvin C.
Reis, A. R. Colbert and B. J. Sickler, who have read the manuscript, and of R. C.
'Wenzel and W. H. Evans, who aided in its preparation.
1. FEDERAL Comu croTuor0s Cou.sSIoN, Unwonu Szs=mi or Accouirm r
TELEPHONE COMPANIES; FEDERAL POWER COMUMSSxON, UNIFORi SYvsM or AccoUrNrS
roR PuRLIc UT rrIEs AND LiSmNsns; NATIONAL AssocIriN OF RAhMOAD r UTM-
TEs COBISSIONERS, Uinrou SYsTE= or AccouTers ror E.ncraic UTr=s Aim
Ui-roao Sysnu or Accouyrrs FoR GAS UTILrrms; SEcuurrm ANm ExcAN Cone-
Mssiox, UNIroFU SYsTm or AccouxTs roI MUTUAL SERVICE COUMPAIES AND Sun-
sm kRy SERvIcE COMPAmS AND UmiroRu Sy.7s or Accorms ror Punuc UTm,,
HoLmNG ComPANIE.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has under consideration a uniform system of
accounts for motor carriers, which is not considered in this article.
2 American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. United States, 57 Sup. Ct. 170 (1936).
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delay in completing investigations and reaching conclusions.' No small
part of this delay has been caused by time-consuming and expensive
audits (and appraisals) to uncover facts, many of which should be
shown on the face of the accounts. To the general public, accounts and
accounting seem prosaic matters; they do not make the headlines. Yet
they are indispensable to regulation.4
The current movement for utility accounting reform arose from a
growing conviction that prior systems of accounts were unable to fur-
nish essential information quickly. Most of the prior systems antedated
1924.' Almost as soon as they were initiated, the utility industries entered
upon an era of consolidation,' securities speculation, transactions between
affiliated interests, investment banker domination, and system building
through growth of transmission lines and interconnections. The older
systems of accounts were not designed with such transactions or devel-
opments in view. The abuses of the period, comprehensively disclosed
by the Federal Trade Commission investigation, 7 were such as could
not be detected readily from the accounts or statistical reports. The
system of administrative regulation became greatly hampered. When
the depression came, the public was inclined to condemn the entire insti-
tution as a failure because it seemed slow and cumbersome.
Depressions are traditional]%. a time for overhauling governmental and
econoimic institutions. So it was with public utility regulation. What
many believe, or hope, is that a renascence of utility regulation has set
in, stimulated and aided by the expansion of federal control over utilities;
one of the first undertakings in this period of renewed energy was the
reform of obsolete systems of accounts.
The official lineage of the more novel principles in the new account-
ing systems dates back at least to 1931.8 In that year the Public Service
3. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, St. Joseph Stock Yards Co,
v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 88 (1936).
4. Among their first activities both the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Motor Carriers, started devising uni-
form accounting regulations under the regulatory authority granted to them. Thus the
annual report of the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. for 1936 represents a new
accounting procedure for the Bell System undertaken to meet the requirements of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. N. Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1937, p. 27, col. 2.
5. The last accounting system for electric utilities recommended by the National
Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners was adopted in 1922; the Federal
Power Commission classification of accounts for licensees was adopted in 1922. No
revision of the system of accounts for telephone companies was made between 1913
and 1933.
6. BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY (1932).
7. FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIssIoN, UTIu.IT CoaxoRATroxs, SEN. Doc. No. 92(72-A),
70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928).
8. Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, Partial Revision of 1923 Uniform
Classification of Accounts for Class A Electric Utilities, 2-U-66, Nov. 24, 1931.
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Commission of Wisconsin ordered a partial revision of its system of
accounts for electric utilities. In the revised system, electric utilities were
required to record all property built or acquired in the future at "original
cost"- that is, cost at the time the property was first devoted to public
service. A separate account, "Fixed Capital Purchase Adjustment," was
provided to record the difference between original cost and what the
acquired property cost the accounting utility. In addition, stock discount
and selling expense were segregated among the assets on the balance
sheet, instead of being "buried" in "Organization Expense" among the
fixed capital accounts. New accounts were provided on the balance sheet
and in operating expenses to record transactions between affiliated in-
terests. These three innovations were the most striking features of
Wisconsin's partial revision of its utility accounting system in 1932.
The New York Public Service Commission went further in the same
direction. In 1934 and 1935, completely revised systems of accounts for
electric, gas, omnibus, telephone, and water utilities were prescribed.
The New York Commission likewise required plant to be recorded at
original cost but it also provided that the excess of purchase price above
original cost should be written off to net income or surplus. Segrega-
tion of stock discount and selling expense, and of transactions between
affiliated interests, was also required. In addition, New York ordered
transmission plant to be classified separately from distribution plant,
prescribed straight-line depreciation accounting, and required income
taxes to be recorded as a deduction from income after interest.
Meanwhile, the National Association of Railroad and Utilities Com-
missioners had instructed its Committee on Utility Statistics and Accounts
of Public Utility Companies to prepare revised systems of accounts for
electric and gas utilities.10 At the 1935 convention a draft of an account-
ing system for electric utilities was submitted" but in view of the then
recent enactment of the Federal Power Act -12 and the Public Utility
Holding Company Act,' 3 the Association instructed its accounting com-
mittee to consider the suggestions of the Federal Power and the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commissions, as well as the suggestions of the utilities,
9. New York Public Service Commission: Electric, ordered Nov. 23, 1933, effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1934; Gas, ordered Nov. 23, 1933, effective Jan. 1, 1934; Omnibus, ordered
Nov. 23, 1933, effective Jan. 1, 1934; Water, ordered Nov. 23, 1933, effective Jan. 1,
1934; Telephone, ordered June 26, 1934, effective Jan. 1, 1935.
10. N&TioNAL AssocrATioN OF RAILROAD AND UTMLTIES COIUTISsIO;MS, Pno-
cEEDIIGs, 45TH ANxuAL Com irrroN (1933) 459.
11. Id. 47TH A-xNUAL CovErrioN (1935) 110.
12. FEDERAL PowER Ac, 49 STAT. 838, 16 U. S. C. A. §§ 791a, 796-00, 803, E07,
810, 811, 816-818, 824-824h, 825-825r (Supp. 1935).
13. PutLuc UTi~rr HOLDING COI zIANY Acr oF 1935, 49 STAT. 838, 15 U.S. C. A.
§§79-79z-6 (Supp. 1935).
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for a revision of the 1935 draft. Out of numerous meetings came a
revised system of accounts for electric utilities, prescribed by the Federal
Power Commission in June, 1936, effective January 1, 1937, and in
substantially identical form approved by the Executive Committee of
the Association in June and recommended by the Association at its
annual convention in November, 1936. At the same time the Associa-
tion recommended an accounting classification for gas utilities which
follows the essential major principles of the electric system.
The regulatory spotlight then turned to the United States Supreme
Court. It had under consideration the uniform system of accounts for
telephone utilities, prescribed by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, and its decision in effect upheld the major new principles not only
of the telephone classification but also of the electric classifications of
the Federal Power and state commissions, as well as the classification
for gas companies, for all these systems of accounts are based in large
measure upon the so-called "original cost" principle, which was the chief
point of attack in the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
case.
14
The whole movement for public utility accounting reform is recapitu-
lated in the history of the system of accounts for telephone companies.
The Interstate Commerce Commission prescribed the first system of uni-
form accounts for telephone companies, effective January 1, 1913. The
first revision of this classification was made effective just two decades
later, January 1, 1933, by the same agency. Most of the state commissions
joined in strenuous protests against this revised system. Among the
chief allegations was that the revision combined certain accounts so as
to obscure information needed by the states in regulating telephone rates.
The states also argued for the "original cost" basis of recording tele-
phone plant.
This protest from the state commissions prompted the Interstate Com-
merce Commission to re-open the case for hearing although it did not
stay the effectiveness of the classification. Over a huhdred specific criti-
cisms were presented by the state commissions and all except a few were
disapproved by the Interstate Commerce Commission in a report of
recommendations issued July 9, 1934."5 The report was limited to recom-
mendations without order, because before its issuance the Congress
passed the Federal Communications Act, whereby the Federal Communi-
cations Commission inherited the Interstate Commerce Commission's
jurisdiction over telephone accounting."
14. 57 Sup. Ct. 170 (1936).
15. 203 I. C. C. 13 (1934).
16. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS Acr, 48 STAT. 1064, 47 U. S. C. § 151 (1934).
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The Communications Commission gave more sympathetic considera-
tion to the pleas of the state commissions. After hearings and confer-
ences, with both state commissions and company officials, the system of
accounts involved in the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
case was prescribed, 7 effective January 1, 1936. In this system which
had been recommended to the state commissions By the National Asso-
ciation of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners at its 1935 con'vention,'
most of the ideas contended for by the state commissions were adopted.
2.
It is possible here to call attention only to a few of the major changes
in practice required by the new systems of accounts, like (1) statement
of plant accounts on the basis of original cost, (2) separate classification
of transmission and distribution plant and expenses, (3) segregation
of capital stock discount and selling expense, (4) segregation of trans-
actions between affiliated interests, (5) depreciation accounting, (6)
uniformity of state and federal classifications.
(1) Original Cost Principle. The accounts provided for recording
the ledger cost of utility plant for balance sheet purposes in the new
and old systems of accounts for electric utilities when compared present
this picture :
New Old
ACCOUNT No. CAPTION ACCOUNT No. CAPION
100 Utility Plant 101 Fixed Capital
100-1 Utility Plant in Service
100-2 Utility Plant Leased to Others
100-3 Construction Work in Progress
100-4 Utility Plant Held for Future
Use "
100-5 Utility Plant Acquisition Ad-
justments
100-6 Utility Plant in Process of Re-
classification
107 Utility Plant Adjustments
Account 100 is a summary of accounts 100-1 to 100-6, inclusive.
A utility may elect or a commission may require, in the annual
17. Federal Communications Commission, Telephone Division, Order No. 7-C,
June 19, 1935.
18. NATIONAL AssocIATioN Or RA0RoAD AND UTILrEs CoMsssx.N ns, Proca-
nlGs, 47TH ANuAL Co N 1NON, (1935), 4S0.
19. The provisions described are taken from the system of accounts recommended
by the National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners. Substantially
similar provisions will be found in the Federal Pover Commission's classification. Theme
provisions are a later formulation than those in the Federal Communications Commis-
sion classification.
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report of the utility or otherwise, that the amounts recorded in the
separate accounts be shown. Account 100-1 includes the original cost
of plant in service, original cost being defined as the cost at the time
the property was first devoted to public service, whether by the present
owner or a preceding owner. Accounts 100-2 and 100-3 are self-ex-
planatory. In Account 100-4 is to be included the original cost, defined
as above, of property owned and held for use in utility service in the
future "under a definite plan for such use."
In view of the controversy aroused by account 100-5, Utility Plant
Acquisition Adjustments, its text is quoted in full:
"A. This account shall include the difference between (a) the cost
to the accounting utility of utility plant acquired as an operating
unit or system by purchase, merger, consolidation, liquidation or
otherwise, and (b) the original cost, estimated if not known, of
such property, less the amount or amounts which may be credited.
to the depreciation and amortization reserves of the accounting
utility at the time of acquisition with respect to such property. The
account shall be so subdivided, when practicable, as to show the
amounts applicable to utility plant in service, utility plant leased to
others, and utility plant held for future use. (See utility plant in-
structions 2, 3, and 4).
"B. Vhenever practicable. this account shall be subdivided ac-
cording to the character of the amounts included herein for each
property acquisition.
"C. The amounts recorded in this account with iespect to each
property acquisition. shall be depreciated, amortized, or otherwise
disposed of, as the Commission may approve or direct." '20
This account is to be used only when an operating unit or system is
acquired: that is, it would be unnecessary to find the original cost of a
small section of pole line, carved out of another utility's system.
Account 100-6 is intended as a temporary place for recording the
balances in the old plant accounts until reclassification according to the
new system has been accomplished. Account 107, Utility Plant Adjust-
ments, was provided to segregate "write-ups- of book cost, at the effec-
tive date of the system of accounts, above cost to the accounting utility.
The account carries a note cautioning against construing it as approving
or .authorizing the recording of appreciation of utility plant.
The new plant accounts on the balance sheet are merely subdivisions
of the one old account for "Fixed Capital." Further classification of
"Plant in Service" is provided in detailed plant accounts, similar to those
20. Cf. Account 100-4 Telephone Plant Acquisition Adjustment in the Federal
Communications Commission classification for telephone companies, as ordered on June
19, 1935 (supra, note 17) and as modified on Jan. 7, 1937 (infra, note 35).
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in the old systems. Except for the separation of transmission from dis-
tribution plant and the elimination of capital stock discount and expense
from intangible property, discussed later, there appears to be little con-
troversy over these primary plant accounts.
The use of the new accounts may be illustrated as follows: Assume
Company A buys all the property of Company B for $1,000,000. Assume
further that the original cost of this property is found to be $900,000
and the accrued depreciation at time of purchase is estimated at $100,000,
or a net original cost of $800,000. Company A would record in Ac-
count 100-1 the original cost of $900,000, and in its depreciation
reserve, $100,000. The difference between the amount paid for the
property ($1,000,000) and the net property recorded ($800,000), which
is $200,000, would be recorded in Account 100-5, Utility Plant Acqui-
sition Adjustments. Thus both the cost of the property to the accounting
utility and the original cost of the property can be recorded.
Certain problems may arise in connection with the disposition of
amounts recorded in the Acquisition Adjustment account. A utility may
seek to retain these amounts in this account until the property to which
they refer is retired from service. If the excess above original cost paid
for such property were a fair amount, arrived at in arms-length deal-
ings, this disposition probably would be approved by a commission. If
the origin of the excess were otherwise, some other disposition might
be required, according to the circumstances of each case.
There are three accounts through which acquisition adjustments may
be depreciated, amortized, or otherwise written off. A special account
505, Amortization of Utility Plant Acquisition Adjustments, is pro-
vided in the operating expense group, coordinate with account 503,
Depreciation. If written off through this account, the ratepayers bear
the burden. The amounts may be extinguished through account 537,
Miscellaneous Amortization, which is grouped with Income Deductions,
after interest. In that event, or if written off against earned surplus
of prior years, the burden falls on stockholders.21
(2) Separate Classification of Transmission and Distribution Plant
and Expenses. The older systems of accounts made no distinction be-
between transmission and distribution property in the detailed plant
accounts. The new systems make such a separation and carry the same
21. The New York Public Service Commission, in revising its system of accounts,
effective Jan. 1, 1934, likewise required the "operating property" accounts to be stated
on the basis of original cost. If the utility paid more for purchased property than its
original cost less accrued depreciation at time of acquisition, the excess was to be
carried in Account 143, Suspense to be Amortized. Any amortization of excess book
cost over original cost was included in Account 456, Miscellaneous Amortization, which
is one of the income deduction accounts after interest on debt. In this position in the
income account, writing off the excess is a stockholders' burden.
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separation into the operating expense accounts. To do this requires a
definition of transmission for purposes of accounting. Briefly stated, the
definition of transmission plant includes (a) conversion stations at a
primary source of supply, such as generating plants; (b) land, struc-
tures, lines and equipment between "a generating or receiving point
and the entrance to a distribution center or wholesale point"; and (c)
lines and equipment whose primary purpose is to tie together sources
of power supply.
The Federal Power Commission and the National Association have
identical instructions on this point. The New York system of accounts
uses different terminology, but the differences in substance are largely
of technical interest only. The National Association's classification for
gas utilities has a similar separation between transmission and distri-
bution, adapted to the operations and terminology of that industry.
(3) Segregation of Capital Stock Discount and Selling Expense. All
the new systems of accounts here considered, with the partial exception
of the New York plan,22 provide separate balance sheet accounts for
discount on capital stock, and commissions and expenses incurred in the
issuance and sale of stock. Heretofore such costs have been treated as
part of organization expense which has beei, and still is, included among
the intangible property accounts. The present view is that these costs
are of a financial character, similar to discount and expense incurred in
the issuance and sale of debt obligations, even though capital stock has
no maturity date. Treating them as costs of financing, it is felt that
such costs should be separately shown2" and not used to increase the
property and plant account.
All the new classifications permit the amortization or writing off of
these financing costs to earned surplus, and, at least to a limited extent,
the accounting systems prescribed thus far by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission permit, in addition, the writing off of such costs
to capital surplus. All the new systems require the extinguishment of
any applicable remaining financing costs in these two accounts upon
.reacquisition or (except in the Securities and Exchange Commission
systems) retirement of stock.
(4) Segregation of Transactions between Affiliated Interests. Pro-
vision is made for full disclosure of transactions between affiliated in-
terests. All charges by affiliated companies must go through a mandatory
22. The New York system of accounts provides only for "Capital Stock Expense",
presumably because under New York statutes (N. Y. STocK Com,'oaxrxon LAW § 69)
stock of public utility corporations may not be issued for less than par.
23. The new systems of accounts for New York differ only in that they do not
provide a separate balance sheet account for discount on capital stock, although an
account for capital stock expense is provided. However, a note to Account 301, Organiza-
tion, specifically excludes "any discounts upon securities issued or assumed."
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clearing account before being spread in other accounts. "The records
supporting this account shall be so kept as to show the nature of each
charge together with the account or accounts to which each charge is
cleared." 24 This is designed to bring together in one place all such charges,
so that they may be readily analyzed and traced to the primary accounts
in Which they are finally recorded.
Four special accounts are provided in the balance sheet for recording
such transactions. Among the assets are account 111, Investments in
Associated Companies, and account 126, Receivables from Associated
Companies. Among the liability accounts are account 212, Advances
from Associated Companies, and account 223, Payables to Associated
Companies. In the operating expense accounts is account 794, Manage-
ment and Supervision Fees and Expenses.
(5) Depreciation Accounting. In the older systems of accounts for
electric utilities, the provisions relating to depreciation were very general
and loose. An account was provided in the income statement for record-
ing "Retirement Expense", and a "Retirement Reserve" account was
included among the liabilities. The classifications expressly or tacitly
permitted the practice of making provision for retirements contingent
upon earnings available for dividends. Most electric utilities, therefore,
adjusted retirement expense according to financial expediency and the
desire or need for dividend distributions.
The new accounting systems embody significantly different principles.
In the new accounts, depreciation is treated as a cost which is to be
reflected in the income statement for each accounting period.2  Instead of
depending in a large measure upon the whims of the financial managers,
it is defined as "the loss in service value not restored by current mainten-
ance incurred in connection with the consumption or prospective retire-
ment of utility plant in the course of service from causes which are
known to be in current operation and against which the utility is not
protected by insurance. Among the causes to be given consideration are
wear and tear, decay, action of the elements, inadequacy, obsolescence,
changes in the art, changes in demand and requirements of public author-
ities."25 Thus defined, depreciation is an element of cost regardless of
24. NATIOxAL ASSOCATION OF RAILROAD AND UTnLrrTs CoumIsso:4xns, UNrou_
SysTm OF AccouNTS FoR ELicmxc UTurrres, Account 90, Charges by Associated Com-
panies-Clearing, par. C.
24a. However, depredation on properties held for future use, in the new accounting
systems, is not to be charged to operating expenses.
25. NATIONAL AssocIATIoN OF RAILROAD AND UTILITIES COITISSIONES, UZTIF0 U
SYsM OF AccouNTs FOR ELECTRIC UTnLrrms, Definition 13. Cf. SnMurrS Aim
ExcHAxGc ComIssIoN, UNIFOR.X Sys= OF AccouTs FOR PUBLIC UTI, HoLuNG
CompAinas, Account 229, Depreciation, and Account 180, Reserve for Depreciation.
In the latter system, "it is the purpose of the reserve to accumulate during the useful
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the financial fortunes of the business. Items of plant and equipment
inevitably march toward the scrap-heap whether or not earnings are
available for interest or dividends. Failure to record depreciation under-
states the cost of rendering service during an accounting period and tends
to mislead investors and others. In this respect the new systems of ac-
counts follow in the main the views of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission20 and are a radical departure from most of the previous classi-
fications for electric utilities.
The new classifications do differ among themselves in one respect-
the method of accruing depreciation. Some are explicit; others are general
so as to permit use of different bases of accrual. In this, they reflect the
sharp conflicts of opinion existing ol this subject. The federal system
of accounts for telephone companies and the New York system for
electric corporations are explicit in prescribing straight-line depreciation
accounting." The National Association's classification for electric utili-
ties requires no particular method of accrual, in deference to the varied
opinions of state commissions. The Federal Power Commission system
of accounts does not expressly require straight-line depreciation account-
ing, but the utility is required to classify both annual depreciation expense
and the depreciation reserve by six functional groups of property-steam
production, hydro production, internal combustion engine production,
transmission, distribution, and general.28
(6) Uniformity of State and Federal Classifications. The possibility
of jurisdictional disputes between federal and state regulatory authorities
was enhanced with the enactment of the Federal Communications Act,20
Federal Power Act,"0 Motor Carrier Act,31 and Public Utility Holding
Company Act.32 The states, mindful of what happened to their powers
life of physical property an amount sufficient to write off the book cost, plus cost of
removal, less salvage, of all classes of depreciable property included in Account 101,
Miscellaneous Investments. Credits to this account shall be made in such way that
operations of each year shall bear a proportionate share of the burden. Debits shall be
made in such way as to accomplish the purpose stated . . . "
26. Telephone and Railroad Depreciation Charges, 177 I. C. C. 351 (1931).
27. FEDERAL COAIuUNICATIONS COMISSION, UNIFORM SYSTEM or ACCOUNTS FOR
TELEPHONE COMPANIES, Instructions 80-83. incl.: NEW YORK PUBLIC SERVICE COL-
IMISSION, UNIFORM SYsTEm OF ACCOUNTS FOR ELECTRIC CORPORATIONS, Instruction 8.
28. Under these provisions direct controversy, with either utilities or state com-
missions, is avoided until the Federal Power Commission prescribes a particular method
of accruing depreciation. Conflict is then likely to ensue when state requirements differ
and the utility is under both jurisdictions.
29. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS AcT OF 1934, 48 STAT. 1064, 1102, 15 U. S. C. § 21,
47 U. S. C. §§ 35, 151-609 (1934).
30. FEDERAL POWER ACT, 49 STAT. 838, 16 U. S. C. A. § 791a (Supp. 1935).
31. MOTOR CARmIE ACT, 1935, 49 STAT. 543, 49 U. S. C. §§ 301-327 (Supp. 1935).




over intrastate business in the field of railroad regulation under the Shreve-
port doctrine," were inclined to be suspicious of the expansion of federal
regulatory power, and sought to protect their powers as they could. There
is, of course, little justification for jurisdictional conflicts in matters of
account classification. Many utilities are under the jurisdiction of two
regulatory bodies. To meet inconsistent accounting requirements by the
two administrative agencies would entail additional expense for account-
ing which in the long run would probably have to be borne by the rate-
payers. In view of the possibility of conflict, it is therefore an achieve-
ment of considerable public importance that such a high degree of uni-
formity has been secured under the new accounting systems. It is still
too early to determine how many states will actually adopt the federal
classification of accounts for telephone companies, or either the federal
or National Association's classifications for electric utilities. But it is
significant that the National Association has endorsed the federal system
of accounts for telephone companies and has recommended a system for
electric utilities which is practically identical with that of the Federal
Power Commission. Indeed the latter has recently amended its system
of accounts to bring it more in line with that of the Association,' and
the Communications Commission has likewise made last-minute amend-
ments, 5 following the decision in the American Telephone and Telegraph
Co. case, which were previously submitted to the National Association's
Committee on Accounts. While it is to be expected that some state com-
missions will find it necessary to make additions or revisions in order to
meet requirements of state statutes,:" the main structure of the account-
ing systems for telephone and electric utilities seems destined to be sub-
stantially uniform under both federal and state regulation.
The possibility of conflicts between the two jurisdictions does not end
when a new system of accounts is ordered. Any system of accounts re-
quires interpretation from time to time. Inconsistent interpretations by
state and federal accounting authorities will in the course of time destroy
uniformity in applying the system of accounts. Such a result can be
avoided if both state and federal agencies arrange for consultation or
exchange of views on such interpretations. This kind of cooperation be-
tween agencies whose authority is in part exclusive, in part concurrent,
is no novelty in a political system operated according to rules of dual
sovereignty, and is becoming an increasingly important issue in admin-
istrative law and practice.
33. Houston & T. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
34. Federal Power Commission, Order No. 43, Dec. 31, 1936.
35. Federal Communications Commission, Telephone Division, Order No. 7-D,
Jan. 6, 1937.
36. For example, see the classification of accounts prescribed December 21, 1936,
by the Public Utilities Commissioner of Oregon.
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3.
These and other features of the accounting systems were warmly and
thoroughly debated before resort was had to the courts to test their
validity. To give a full-length picture of the uniform accounting move-
ment, it is important to review this discussion briefly, primarily from
the standpoint of regulatory policy.
Attacks have been centered chiefly on the original cost principle. It has
been dubbed the "principle of aboriginal cost,""7 and condemned as un-
sound for a variety of reasons. (1) It is said that original cost account-
ing requires from 80%o to 90%o of the total assets of a utility to be
"deliberately misstated" by recording property at estimated figures which
are neither cost nor value, do not represent cost to the accounting com-
pany and in fact destroy the ability of a company, after a few years,
to ascertain exactly what the assets cost the company, and which necessi-
tate write-ups and write-downs of asset values. (2) The movement scraps
the accounting principles laid down by commissions and followed'by
utilities for 25 years. (3) The new system designates part of the property
by a term ("Acquisition Adjustments") "which of itself seems to cast
doubt upon its legitimacy" and therefore frightens investors and injures
the company's credit. (4) A meaningless and costly reclassification of
present property and plant is required. (5) Utilities are required to
estimate retirement reserves that should have been accumulated by pre-
decessors had they followed a certain concept of depreciation accounting,
to increase such reserves accordingly, and to record in the Adjustment
Account deficits in past accrued depreciation with which the present
owners had nothing to do. (6) A commission may direct that part of
the fixed assets be written off against surplus, which results in confis-
cation. (7) A great and unnecessary increase in accounting expense is
thrust on the utilities, to the detriment of ratepayers and investors, when
less costly and more satisfactory means of providing relevant information
are available. 8
The attack does not stop there. The proponents of the original cost
principle are accused of fantastic fallacies. In answer to the assertion
that the new system furnishes important information in aid of regula-
tion or investment, it is said that: (1) the accounting definition of original
cost differs from that used by the Supreme Court; (2) the Supreme
37. Chamberlain, Regulation by Accounting-An Innovation (1935) 3 EDisoN ELEc-
TRIC INSTITUTE BULLFTIN 301; Gruehn, Aboriginal Cost (1936) 4 EDISON ELECTI C
INSTrrUTE BULLETIN 272.
38. Mr. Chamberlain also criticized the frequency of requiring resort to a com-
mission for authority to make, or for approval of, particular accounting entries. This
criticism was apparently based on an earlier draft of the accounting classification which




Court has never said that original cost could be used as the only or the
major factor evidencing value; (3) the Supreme Court has never sus-
tained the theory of depreciation described in the accounting classifica-
tion nor required a present owner of property to record "hypothetical
deficits in past accrued depreciation"; (4) cost to the accounting company
cannot be maintained under the proposed classification and this is the
important fact to security holders and to management. The utilities did
not exhaust their arsenal of adjectives when they described the original
cost principle as arbitrary, misleading, impractical, unconstitutional, fan-
ciful, costly, and a gross abuse of power.
On the other side of the controversy, the advocates of original cost
and the associated reclassification of property required by these account-
ing systems cite illustrations of the usefulness of such information for
speedy and effective regulation, particularly in rate-making. Original
.cost accounting, it is said, will make constantly available one of the two
ruling criteria of valuation for rate making. The provision of informa-
tion required by the new accounting systems serves another end as well:
giving more exact information to the investment public. Informed in-
vestors may wish to know how much more than original cost of instal-
lation was paid for property by the present owners, how much intangible
value is attached to the value of physical property, or how much of- the
property is held for future use or leased to others. They.are balked in
seeking such information from the present accounting statements of
many utilities. In such cases, few know, sometimes not even the com-
pany officials, what level of valuation was used in stating fixed assets or
what items compose the totals shown. In most cases such information
is unavailable to investors at large; and institutional investors, or regu-
latory commissions, can get it only after tedious and expensive audits
or appraisals of the property.39
Regulatory commissions make varied uses of the ledger values of
utility property. Such data are useful not only in rate proceedings, but
also in passing upon security issues, in reviewing depreciation rates, in
checking rate schedules negotiated with utilities or proposed for filing,
and in reviewing the valuations underlying tax-assessments. These jobs
39. If illustrations are needed, a few from one state can be presented. One company
was acquired by the present interests 20 years ago. After two decades, with one change
in accounting classification at the end of the first decade, only 14% of the reported
fixed capital was properly classified by primary plant accounts. Nearly half was classi-
fied into five broad groups of property and nearly 40% was not classified in any man-
ner. Four of the larger utilities reported over one-fourth of the electric fixed capital
as either "cost of plant and equipment purchased," or "not classified by prescribed
accounts' Of the reported fixed capital of all the Class A electric and joint utilities,
over 16% was shown in the above two unclassified groups or as not classified by utility
service.
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cannot be done quickly if original cost figures are not readily ascertain-
able from the face of the utility's accounts but instead must be dug out
by laborious, expensive, and time-consuming audits or property apprais-
als." As a practical matter, the case for original cost as the basis of
plant accounting may be outlined as follows: (1) Original cost, as defined
in the system of accounts, is concededly relevant in valuation proceedings,
and hence should be constantly available in complete and easily administra-
tive form. (2) Original cost, being relatively stable, promotes uniformity
in plant records and statistical data. (3) Original cost affords a more
useful basis of accurate accounting for plant retirements. (4) Determina-
tion of original cost in most instances requires no more difficult estimates
than are needed in complying with other provisions of this or other sys-
tems of accounts. (5) Once original cost of acquired property is estab-
lished, accounting expenses are no greater than those required by other
methods of recording property, if adequate plant records are maintained.
(6) The original cost basis of accounting is worked out in the new system
of accounts so as not to destroy the record of cost to the accounting
company. (7) Adequate provision is made for permitting the depre-
ciation or amortization of any legitimate amount in excess of original
cost that is paid by the accounting company for purchased properties,
At least since Smyth v. Ames,4 the Supreme Court has repeatedly
acknowledged the propriety of using original cost figures in valuation
for rate making purposes, although it is of course by no means clear
what weights the court requires to be attached to original cost as a
factor in valuation, or whether those weights vary with economic cir-
cumstances. Even the court's most pronounced experiments in repro-
duction cost valuation, however, recognized the relevance of original
cost to the process of fact finding and administrative judgment implicit
in valuation. Thus one clear purpose which the new accounting systems
will serve is quickly to supply the Commissions and the courts with
one of the statistics they require in valuation. Almost without excep-
tion,42 moreover, the courts have used original cost in essentially the
same sense as the accounting definition.43 Commissions have considered
40. For more extended exposition of this situation, see Brief for the United Staten,
pp. 22-23, 25, 34-38; Brief for Federal Communications Commission, p. 38; Brief on
behalf of the National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners, pp. 22-30
in American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 57 Sup. Ct. 170 (1936).
41. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
42. In Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. California R. R. Comm., 289 U. S. 287
(1933), reference is made to the "actual cost of the property-the investment the owners
have made-" as a "relevant fact."
43. Cost of construction is the factor referred to in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Pub. Service Comm. of Missouri, 262 U. S. 276 (1923); 'and
in St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461 (1929). See also 1 Wnrr-
TEN, VALUATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) c. 14. There appears
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original cost as a factor not only in determining a fair rate-base but also
in passing upon security issues, depreciation rates, and rate schedules
proposed for filing.44  They have found such data helpful in judging
the reasonableness of present value estimates as well as in detecting
"write-ups" and intangibles included in property accounts. 45
The use of original cost will promote greater uniformity in plant
records than now exists. Many utilities today have their property re-
corded partly at original cost, and partly at reproduction cost new, at
reproduction cost new less depreciation, at cost to the company, or at
some fiat value established by a promoter interested in selling securities.
It has been found that going value, water power value, franchise value,
even bond discount, have been included in the plant accounts. Not in-
frequently, a "cost to the company" is claimed which includes overhead
expenses that were never incurred, or, if incurred, were originally charged
to operating expenses and recouped from the rate-payers. Under the
new systems of plant accounting, all these variations from original cost
of tangible property are intended to be placed in one account where they
can be more readily analyzed. Once this segregation is accomplished, com-
parison of the costs of plant to different companies may be made with
more assurance. Statistical data which the Federal Power Commission,"0
and state commissions are required to compile will be made more useful.
Similarly a more stable basis of plant accounting has often been sought
in depredation, and the use of the original cost principle offers one. When
property is transferred, the purchaser (if not subject to an original cost
accounting system) may set up his depreciation accounts with reference
to the purchase price, so that a transfer of ownership may carry with it a
sharp change in the depreciation claimed for the property, a fact with
to be a theoretical difference of minor significance between the accounting definition of
original cost of property "when first devoted to public service" and the term as used
by the courts without this qualification. In a few cases property now used for utility
purposes may originally have been installed and.used by a private company for its own,
non-utility service, e.g., generating equipment installed for use in coal mines, and sub-
sequently acquired by a utility. In the accounting system, the cost to the company first
using the property for public utility service is intended as original cost.
44. See note 40, supra.
45. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, U"Tr= CoIponTI'oNs, SEN. Doc. No. 92(72-A),
70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) 845. "The ledger values of the capital assets of all the
companies examined, including both holding and operating companies, contained very
large amounts of write-ups. It was found that the combined amount by which the
capital assets of all the companies examined were written up in value over cost exceeded
1.4 billion dollars. Of this amount, $273,420,165 was in the 18 top holding companies
examined, $309,495,058 was in the 42 subholding companies examined, and $599,327,206
was in the 91 operating companies e.xamined. Additional amounts of $43,874,977 and
$264,904,417, respectively, were found in other subholding and operating companies
principally in connection with the examination of their holding companies."
46. FEDERAL PowER AcT, 49 STAT. 838, 16 U. S. C. A. § 825-c (Supp. 1935).
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puzzling consequences both for the company and for the Commission
charged with regulating it. If depreciation expense is based on original
cost, any additional allowance for depreciation or amortization that may
be justified in recognition of the resale at a higher piice can be allowed
with clear recognition of what the allowance is supposed to cover. When
an operating unit or system is purchased, it ordinarily is soon merged
with property installed by the utility and the identity of the purchased
property is lost. Upon retirement from service, the amount written out
of the plant accounts may be greater or less than the purchase price. If
the retirement value is greater than cost to the company, the remaining
property is understated; if less, a residue of book value remains in the
accounts which should not be there, for the property is gone. Although
the refinements of depreciation accounting on the unit basis are not re-
quired, the use of original cost should facilitate a more accurate estimate
of retirement values and thus lessen the opportunities for unrecorded
retirements or over-retirements.
Critics of the new accounting classifications have asserted that for
property now in use original cost is generally obtainable by estimate and
that such estimates are bound to be inaccurate, especially where the
predecessor company or compinies kept no records or inadequate records,
or the records have been lost.47 Unquestionably estimates of original
cost must be made where facts are not available. But* valuation proceed-
ings are full of estimates. Cost of reproduction, after all, is a highly
theoretical kind of estimate.48 It has not been shown that estimates of
original cost are more uncertain or inaccurate or impossible than other
kinds of estimates commonly used in valuation proceedings or in utility
accounting.49
Allegations that the new methods of plant accounting are more costly
than the old ones, are difficult either to prove or disprove"0 because ex-
perience has been so limited. In Wisconsin where several determinations
of original cost have been made, the expense involved has not exceeded
that of making an inventory and appraisal. This cost should be non-
recurring, if reasonably accurate accounting methods are pursued in the
future. Advocates of the system point out that the initial expense of
determining original cost of the acquired property should not be confused
with the expense of keeping it up to date. Assertions have been made
that the new basis of accounting, once established, has made possible
47. Brief for Plaintiffs, 48, in American Tel. & Tel Co. v. United States, 14 F.
Supp. 121 (S.D. N.Y. 1936).
48. Cf. Ohio Utilities Co. v. Public Util. Comm. of Ohio, 267 U.S. 359 (1925).
49. See the oral argument of Hon. John E. Benton before the United States
Supreme Court in American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 57 Sup. Ct. 170 (1936).
50. Brief for the United States, p. 54, in American Tel. & Tel.,Co. v. United States,
57 Sup. Ct. 170 (1936).
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certain savings in the expense of plant accounting. At present this virtue
can be claimed only as a possibility, or at best a probability, depending
upon the detailed routines established for continuing the record. But
even if this method of plant accounting were more costly to keep current
than less elaborate accounting systems, any greater expense should be
balanced against the greater usefulness of the information so obtained
and the alternative cost of periodic appraisals of original cost as occasion
arises. Finally, it should be mentioned that part of the allegedly greater
cost of using an original cost accounting system arises from the necessity
of unscrambling the "undistributed cost of property" which so many
utilities report"1 and which, as a major vice of their present plant ac-
counts, the proposed systems are intended to correct.
Whether or not the original cost basis of plant accounting destroys
the record of cost to the accounting company has been warmly debated
among the professional accountants. 2 Two points have emerged from
their discussion. (1) Present practices of recording merged or acquired
properties are so varied that it is questionable whether cost to the account-
ing company is preserved even under existing systems of accounts. Some
companies record acquired properties at the predecessor company cost
and take over the accrued depreciation or retirement reserve; others enter
the property in the accounts at appraised cost of reproduction new and
add to the reserve the accrued depreciation determined by. the appraiser;
still others record in the plant account cost of reproduction less depre-
ciation and do not record accrued depredation in the reserve; and still
others enter the purchase price, however determined, in the plant account
with no change in the depredation reserve. (2) Whatever method of
recording acquired properties is used, as soon as retirements of such
property are made, the cost of acquisition to the purchasing company
is impaired under the retirement accounting practices of most utilities.
In any event the mechanics of the new system of accounts are such as
to permit recording both original cost and cost to the accounting com-
pany at the time of acquisition.
Other aspects of the proposed systems which have caused dissension
among the accountants are the treatment of stock discount and selling
expense, and the provisions for depredation accounting. The accounting
treatment of capital stock discount and selling expense is challenged
largely because it is an assault upon that convenient catch-all, "organ-
ization expense," thereby curtailing the amounts which may be included
in the property accounts. It has been assailed as a vrongful taking of
property because these items have always been considered as part of
organization expense; because they are necessary costs of organizing and
51. See note 39 supra.
52 See e.g., articles by Chamberlain and Gruehn, both supra note 37.
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carrying on a business; and because they are not subject to amortization
over any particular period, since stock has no pre-determined maturity
date.
On the other hand, the Federal Trade Commission's report' s lists
numerous instances where surreptitious profits were given to insiders
in transfers of stock ownership and carried into the property accounts
by manipulation of stock discounts and selling expenses. The new ac-
counting treatment is designed primarily to bring such transactions into
the open. The argument is also made that stock discount and selling
expense are merely costs of equity financing similar to bond discount
and expense. The absence of a maturity date is no obstacle to amortiza-
tion, if desirable, over a reasonable period.
54
Reactions to the depreciation accounting requirements in the new sys-
tems of accounts have varied. The telephone industry, having long fol-
lowed straight-line depreciation under prevailing court decisions,5 raised
no objection to this requirement with respect to property in service. The
electric utilities raised serious objection. In the other classifications, no
particular depreciation policy was expressly prescribed. Indeed, to meet
the varying views of state commissions, the text of the National Asso-
ciation's classification is so general as to permit almost any method of
depreciation accounting.50 The Federal Power Commission's classification
is similarly general but in requiring a breakdown of depreciation charges
and reserves by groups of primary plant accounts, a struggle portends
53. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, UTILITY CORPORATIONS, SEN. Doc. No. 92 (72-A),
70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928).
54. One phase of this question has been neglected. If stock discount and expense
are amortized, are the annual provisions for amortization deductible for income tax
purposes? It would appear not, unless the rulings of the Internal Revenue Bureau
are changed. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, art. 22(a)-16.
55. It has been customary practice for most telephone companies, especially those
in the Bell system, to accrue depreciation reserves on the straight-line basis, but in
valuation cases they claim that accrued depreciation determined on different bases is much
less than that for which they have made provision by charges to operating expenses.
Cf. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Whitman, 3 F. (2d) 938 (D. Md. 1925);
New York Telephone Co. v. Prendergast, 36 F. (2d) 54, 65-66 (S.D. N.Y. 1929);
Re Wisconsin Telephone Co., 13 P. U. R. (N.s.) 224, 301-302 (1936); Punrac SERvIcE
COMMISSION OF WISCONSIN, DEPRECIATION: A REVIEW OF LEGAL AND AcCOUNTING PROB-
LEM S (1933).
56. "Account 503, Depreciation. This account shall include the depreciation expense
applicable to utility plant in service (account 100-1) for the period covered by the
income account, except such depreciation expense as may be charged to clearing accounts
or to construction work in progress."
See also General Instruction 9: "Each utility shall record as of the end of each
month the estimated amount of depreciation accrued during that month on depreciable




with those utilities who wish to continue making retirement provisions
dependent upon earnings.
Other provisions of the new systems of accounts than those herein
discussed have been criticized by utility officials and accountants." Ho,-
ever, this is not the proper occasion for a review of the accounting
details. In this article, the controversy as to accounting and administrative
procedure serves mainly as background for an analysis of the two prin-
cipal legal assaults upon the new accounting systems.
4.
Failing in the attempt to persuade commissions not to adopt the new
principles, the utilities resorted to the courts. The case for the utilities
-was based on the argument that to force them to show on their books
the "original cost" of their property, if different from cost to the ac-
counting company, to amortize ledger values other than original cost
separately from depreciation, or to require deductions from surplus was
confiscatory faking of the utilities' property, in violation of the Fifth
or the Fourteenth Amendments. A compulsory accounting system was
a taking of property, they contended, because corporate books are
the source of data crucial in public regulation, financing, and in in-
fluencing the judgment of investors, so that prescribed rules of account-
ing would affect the companies' income and capital value. Two actions
were commenced, one in New York, the other in the federal courts.
In the former action, the utilities were successful; in the other, they
largely failed. However, these two cases, when tied to three prior Supreme
Court decisions upholding the Interstate Commerce Commission's power
to prescribe uniform accounting and to require statistical information,"3
do throw some light upon the probability of holding the revised systems
of accounts valid.
The first case dates from 1912. The Goodrich Transit Company en-
gaged in both interstate and intrastate water transportation; part of its
business was joint rail and water interstate transportation. Eighty per
cent of its business was alleged to be intrastate. Likewise, the White
Star Line claimed that only 1% of its revenue was derived from inter-
state joint rail-water traffic; in addition it operated two amusement parks.
57. See "Comments, Suggestions, and Recommendations", "Memorandum re Depre-
ciation Charges and Reserves and the Recording of 'Original Cose of Propw. ry,
submitted by the Accounting Committee of the Edison Electric Institute, March,
1936, and April 10, 1936, respectively, to the Committee on Statistics and Accounts
of Public Utility Companies of the National Association of Railroad and Utilities
Commissioners and to the Federal Power Commission.
58. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194
(1912) ; Kansas City Southern Ry. v. United States, 231 U.S. 423 (1913); Norfolk
and Western Ry. v. United States. 287 U.S. 134 (1932).
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These two carriers challenged the Interstate Commerce- Commission's
requirements that revenues and expenses of interstate, intrastate, and
non-transportation business be reported separately and objected to fur-
nishing information regarding intrastate and non-transportation business.
The lower court held that the Commission had power only to prescribe
uniform accounting for interstate business."'
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment.60
In sweeping aside the familiar argument that the Commission's authority
to prescribe uniform accounting was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power, the Court used language that is pertinent today.
"If the Commission is to successfully perform its duties in respect
to reasonable rates, undue discriminations and favoritism, it must
be informed as to the business of the carriers by a system of account-
ing which will not permit the possible concealment of forbidden
practices in accounts which it is not permitted to see and concerning
which it can require no information . . . Further, the requiring of*
information concerning a business is not regulation of that busi-
ness." 61
A year later the Supreme Court again upheld the Commission's ac-
counting regulations in a more difficult set of circumstances. 2  The
carrier was reconstructing its line in order to take care of increased
traffic. The rehabilitation was accomplished largely by reducing grades
on existing right of way and partly by.building short sections of new
line in substitution of existing right of way. Six sections of new road
were built at a cost of nearly $764,000, and use of the displaced roadbed
was discontinued. The improvement was to be financed by a bond issue,
and a portion of the bonds, in the amount of $1,250,000 has been sold.
To facilitate the sale of bonds, the carrier began payment of non-cumu-
lative dividends on preferred stock at the rate of 4%.
Accounting regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission re-
quired that where a property betterment was on new roadbed, only the
excess cost of the betterment above the replacement cost of portions of
track and right of way no longer used was to be added to the property
accounts. The abandoned track and roadbed, as well as an abandoned
shop and terminal plant, were to be charged off to operating expenses.
The carrier complained that it should not be required to write off the
abandoned property in the manner prescribed. To do so would increase
operating expenses so that preferred dividends could not be declared,
which in turn would injure the carrier's credit, prevent sale of the bonds,
59. 190 Fed. 943, 966 (Comm. Ct. 1911).
60. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194 (1912).
61. Id. at 221.
62. Kansas City Southern Ry. v. United States, 231 U. S. 423 (1913).
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and stop the entire improvement. The regulations were alleged not only
to deprive preferred stockholders of dividends but also to require the
carrier to return money already borrowed from bondholders. The only
way for the carrier to avoid these results, it was asserted, was to adopt
a more expensive plan of betterments by reducing grades only on exist-
ing right of way.
Nevertheless, the Commission's regulations were upheld, the Court
placing its decision on a ground of considerable significance:
"The present attack upon the classification as adopted is, and must
be, rested at bottom upon the contention that the regulations em-
bodied in it are so entirely at odds with fundamental principles of
correct accounting as intrinsically to manifest an abuse of power."Mc
It further recognized the long-standing and unchallenged distinction
between operating and capital expenses and the need for this distinction
in fixing rates. The carrier's contention, in the Court's opinion, "in
effect ignores depreciation-an inevitable fact which no system of ac-
counts can properly ignore. A more complete depreciation than that
which is represented by a part of the original plant that through destruc-
tion or obsolescence has actually perished as useful property, it would
be difficult to imagine." After reviewing the treatment of depreciation
in the accounting regulations, the Court expressed the opinion that "the
regulation is not arbitrary in the sense of being without reasonable
basis. And there is evidence to show that the Commission was warranted
in adopting it, as sustained by expert opinion and approved by experi-
ence." (Italics supplied) 65
63. Id. at 444.
64. Id. at 448.
65. Id. at 452: The Court also considered the question whether there vs an un-
lawful taking of property, if the regulations resulted in depriving preferred stot holders
of dividends. The Court thought not. Accounting requirements cannot be avoided by
agreements among stockholders apportioning earnings. To admit this vould "tend
to render impracticable the standardization of methods of accounting." (454). The
Court similarly brushed aside the argument that the regulations required the carrier
to return money already borrowed from bondholders. If the loss is charged to operating
expenses and income available for dividends disappears and yet dividends are con-
tinued, they would appear to be paid out of proceeds of the bond issue. "Since one
of the very purposes of establishing the accounting system is to deter the payment
of dividends out of capital, the criticism, upon analysis, bears its own refutation." (455).
Also significant, as showing the scope of the discretion allowed the Commission,
is this sentence. "But, did we agree with appellant that the abandonments ought to be
charged to surplus or to profit and loss, rather than to operating expenses, we still
would not deem this a sufficient ground to declare that the Commission had abused its
power." (456)
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Not until 1932 did the Court have occasion again to review(, a clear-
cut dispute over accounting regulations. The Norfolk & \Western Rail-
way Company, having experienced difficulty in obtaining an adequate
supply of locomotive fuel in the period from 1917 to 1920, bought
three coal mines, adjacent to its right of way. By the terms of purchase,
these mines were to be used "solely for the supply of locomotive fuel."
These collieries furnished about 48% of the carrier's loc6motive fuel
requirements. The investment, after deducting depreciation and deple-
tion, was $2,650,467. The Interstate Commerce Commission instructed
the carrier to record these mining investments in its accounts as non-
transportation property. to account for revenues and expenses therefrom
as miscellaneous operations, and to charge into railway operating ex-
penses the average monthly production cost per ton of coal produced in
the collieries for use in transportation operations. The carrier claimed
these mines were properly classifiable as transportation property.
Again the Commission was sustained. The Commission's accounting
instruction was not in excess of its statutory power, for the Commis-
sion, to perform its duties under the act, must draw a line between
transportation and non-transportation property. With commendable self-
restraint. the Court remarked:
"The record shows thai it ii unuzual for a railroad to own mines
for the production of loro:uotive fuel: in fact we are referred to no
other similar instance. Whether the Commission should make
special classifications to fit exceptional cases lies within the discre-
tion conferred, and courts ought not to be called upon to interfere
with or corrct alleged errors with respect to accounting practice.
If we were in disagrcein'nt with th Connission as to the wisdom
and propriety of the order, -we are without power to usurp its dis-
cretion 'and substitute our own." (Italics supplied)
The Court found no denial of due process of law. The carrier alleged
that by the Commission's mandate an unfair and improper rate-base
was fixed and capital asset properly to be taken into account in a re-
capture case was eliminated. To which the Court replied:
"But this is to ignore the fact that the order is one touching ac-
counting merely; that before any rate base can be ascertained or
any basis of recapture determined the carrier will be entitled to a
full hearing as to what property shall be included; and not until
the Commission excludes the assets in question from the calcu-
lation may the carrier assert the infliction of injury to its rights
of property . There is no right to a particular form of ac-
counting as such." (Italics supplied) 7
66. Norfolk and Western Railway Co. v. United States. 2S7 U. S 134 (1932).
67. Id. at 141. 143.
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In New York Edison Co. v. Maltbie," electric, gas, steam or water
utilities challenged the validity of revised systems of accounts applicable
to their respective services. Of the five provisions assailed, only one
was held valid. It is necessary to examine the opinion of the Appellate
Division to find the grounds for this holding; the Court of Appeals
merely affirmed the lower court, per ctria, stating that the orders of
the Public Service Commission as construed by the Appellate Division
"directly interfere with private property rights," and for that reason
could be annulled on certiorari.
The Appellate Division opinion is a strange, vague mixture of stat-
utory interpretation and constitutional doctrine. Thus, the requirement
of a perpetual inventory was upheld on the ground that specific authority
had been granted by the legislature. But the straight-line depreciation
requirement was held ultra vires the Commission because "the Legis-
lature has not granted (it) power to fix the method of setting up
depreciation reserves." However, the Court went further; it indicated
its belief that any attempt at such regulation would be invalid because
depreciation is "a managerial problem which should not be controlled
by the uniform system of bookkeeping established by the Commission."
The court also relied on McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co.Y0 as evi-
dencing the disapproval of the United States Supreme Court of straight
line depreciation. But even if the Supreme Court in that case did indi-
cate a preference for the actual observation available in the particular
case rather than service life estimates used by the regulatory authority
to determine depreciation, its view was there a dictum, applied in any
event to the facts of a rate making case, and by no means demonstrates
a deep seated constitutional conviction that straight line depreciation is
for all purposes illegal. That case can hardly be offered alone as ground
for outlawing an integral part of a uniform system of accounts which,
since the McCardle case, has been accepted by accountants and shown
to be justified by experience."1
Likewise, the requirement that regulatory commission expenses be
carried to a suspense account and not charged to operating expenses
until the Commission directed, was held to be "an unwarranted assump-
tion of authority," no such power having been granted by the legis-
lature. But, in addition the Court adds: "If the Legislature had granted
such power, a serious question as to its constitutionality would arise,
as these expenses should not be paid from a capital account." This
68. 244 App. Div. 685, 281 N. Y. Supp. 223 (3d Dep't 1935), aff'd 271 N. Y. 103,
2 N. E. (2d) 277 (1936).
69. Pum. SEav. Comm- LAw § 114, added by L. 1934, c. 287.
70. 272 U.S. 400 (1926).
71. See PuBuc SE~vicE Comissiou OF Wmscomsm, DPRaEcrATioN: A Rvmvr
OF LA.L AI AccoUNTING PRoBLEMS (1933) 97 et seq.
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statement is of course obiter; and a misconstruction of the accounting
requirements as -well.
The Appellate Division also held the prescribed accounting for capital
stock expense invalid on the ground that since expenses involved in
marketing capital stock are "elements of value on which a utility cor-
poration is entitled to receive a return," to prevent the utility from list-
ing it as a property asset is confiscatory. The court cited Ohio Utilities
Co. v. Public Utilities Colmission7 2 as justifying its conclusion. The
latter case does not, however, support this position. There the Supreme
Court frowned upon indiscriminate elimination of all organization ex-
penses from a reproduction cost estimate as arbitrary. The decision is by
no means binding authority against the validity of a requirement for the
segregation of capital stock expense from property accounts.
The major part of the Appellate Division opinion held the New York
method of accounting for acquired property on the basis of original
cost"3 arbitrary and confiscatory. Relying on the Iroquois Gas case,74
although the holding there involved a wholly different problem, the
Court held the Commission without power to impose such conditions,
for:
. . . to be required to show a loss on the books when none
has been suffered is arbitrary. Many of the fixed capital accounts
ordered to be redistributed contain entries reflecting purchases
from predecessor utilities that were approved by the Commission
and other entries concerning consolidation and purchases which have
been approved by courts, including the Supreme Court of the United
States. These entries are not made upon the basis of 'original cost'
as the Commission now seeks to define it. Financing has been car-
ried on and transactions made on the basis of these figures as to
fixed capital. A requirement that a part now be charged off is con-
fiscatory."'t5
Since the Appellate Division opinion and its affirmance by the Court
of Appeals came before the realistic and sympathetic"0 decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the American Telephone and
72. 267 U. S. 352 (1925). Cf. note 83 infra.
73. Supra, note 21. It will be recalled that the excess above original cost was to
be placed in a suspense account and written off against net income as the Commission
might by order prescribe.
74. People ex rel. Iroquois Gas Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm., 264 N. Y. 17,
189 N. E. 764 (1934).
75. New York Edison v. Maltbie. 244 App. Div. 685, 689-690, 281 N. Y. Supp.
223, 228-229 (3d Dep't 1935). aff'd 271 N. Y. 103, 2 N. E. (2d) 277 (1936).
76. See 'Mr. Justice Cardozo's analysis of the relevance of original cost accounting
to the problem of regulating telephone companies, American Tel. and Tel. Co. v.
United States, 57 Sup. Ct. 170, 173 (1936).
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Telegraph Co.77 case, it is difficult to state definitely the present status
of the utility accounting revisions in New York or to predict with any
degree of assurance what effect the federal litigation will have on the
attitude of the New York courts.
The federal litigation was started when forty-four telephone com-
panies, all except seven being members of the Bell system, sought an
injunction before a three judge district court restraining enforcement
by the Federal Communications Commission of its order prescribing
a revised system of accounts, effective January 1, 1936.71 The com-
panies attacked the order on three principal grounds: (1) The order
was unsupported by a report stating conclusions and basic findings. (2)
The accounting requirements exceed the Commission's statutory power
"and are so contrary to the fundamental principles of correct accounting
as to constitute an abuse of that power, in so far as they treat of original
cost, contributions, certain classifications of telephone plant and depre-
ciation thereon, and just and reasonable charges." (3) The companies
are required -to obey standards too vague and indefinite to be intel-
ligible. The first objection was over-ruled on the basis of dedided cases,
and the companies dropped this point in their appeal. The third vras
disposed of briefly; after distinguishing the authorities cited by plain-
tiffs, the court pointed out that in doubtful cases risk was avoidable by
asking for a Commission interpretation.
The district court concerned itself chiefly with the question whether
the particular accounting requirements assailed constituted a "manifest
abuse of power." The companies stressed two arguments against the
original cost principle-namely, that it prevented the company from
showing its actual investment, and that amounts recorded in the Acqui-
sition Adjustment Account could not be depreciated. After comparing
the present and proposed systems of accounts, it found the first excep-
tion unwarranted: "The requirement that original cost be set forth in
accounting records of the telephone companies serves to complete the
picture of value in revealing the property's financial background and
showing the relationship of a carrier's monetary return to the original
as well as to its own investment. It aids the Commission in its duty to
determine, from all the pertinent circumstances and factors, the just and
reasonable rates which the carrier may exact from its service. Original
cost is a relevant factor. The object of the system of accounts might
well be to display the pertinent financial operation and throw light upon
its present condition. Original cost as a segregated item on a balance
sheet may serve to reveal actualities which may be pertinent in fixing
a rate base on the capitalized earning power of a property purchased.
77. American Tel & Tel. Co. v. United States, 57 Sup. Ct. 170 (1936).
7& American TeL & Tel. Co. v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. N.Y. 1936).
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In making readily available facts which would tend to expose discrep-
ancies in valuation, it cannot be said the system is so arbitrary as to be
beyond the Commission's power. Forty-seven state public utility bodies
acquiesce in the proposed requirements. This is not evidence of unrea-
sonableness." As to the second objection, the Court pointed out that
this assumed the Commission would act improperly in the ,future in not
authorizing amortization in lieu of depreciation. "This cannot be pre-
sumed. The order provides for alternatives adaptable to the facts of
individual cases. This flexibility distinguishes the system at bar from
that held invalid in Ne-w York Edison Co. s,. Maltbie."80
The district court, however, apparently upheld the companies' objec-
tions that no depreciation was allowed on property held for future use,
although the language of the court is somewhat ambiguous:
"The exclusion of depreciation on this account as an item to be
considered in rate determinations may be supportable but it appears.
unjustifiable to bar depreciation on this item altogether. Where
property is withdrawn from service for any portion of its life, upon
its final retirement, the depreciation reserve set up for it would be
inadequate. This can be adjusted by charging the depreciation to
surplus rather than as a current account. Thus a true reflection
of the adjusted value of the property would be obtained, and yet
the accounts will so set off the item that it may be excluded from
consideration as a current expense for rate purposes."8 1
This may be interpreted to mean that depreciation charges on property
held for future use may be excluded from operating expense accounts,
which was the intent of the classification. But in any event, in the final
order. the Communications Commission changed the definition of "time
of installation" from "the date at which telephone plant is completed
ready for service" to "the date at which telephone plant is placed in
telephone service."'SZ This change, considered in connection with the
definition of "service life" for depreciation purposes, may be said to
accomplish what the district court seems to have had in mind.
The district court struck out the instruction directing a purchaser of
property to record contributions made to a prior owner. This provision
was regarded as "swelling the assets and liabilities by a fictitious entry."
The accounting instruction was designed to perpetuate the record of the
79. Id. at 126.
80. Id at 127.
81. Id. at 128.
82. Federal Communications Commission, Telephone Division, Order No. 7-D,
Jan. 6. 1937. With respect to depreciation on property held for future use, the modifi-
cation follows that of the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, Re Uniform System
of Accounts for Class A and Class B Telephone Companies, 2-U-902, Dec. 20, 1935.
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sources of capital to finance the original cost of the property. The
Commission's final order in compliance with the decree provided for
keeping a memorandum record of such acquired contributions.
The companies also objected to the segregation of capital stock ex-
pense on the balance sheet. However, the district court held that this
was not arbitrary, in view of differences of opinion among accountants,
an ittitude which contrasts favorably with that entertained with respect
to an identical provision by the New York court."3
Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court,8 ' the companies
renewed most of their objections, chiefly to the original cost principle.
The court selected four of them for discussion. The companies claimed
that the original cost provisions prevented them from recording
their actual investment, thus misleading interested persons, largely on
the ground that the Acquisition Adjustment Account, representing the
difference between original and present cost, "must be written off com-
pletely." But such an interpretation of the regulation, the Court declared,
was an "imputed meaning," "not the true one." "On the contrary, only
such amount will be written off as appears, upon an application for
appropriate directions, to be a fictitious or paper increment." This con-
struction, derived from the affidavits and from argument of counsel,
was fortified, "to avoid the chance of misunderstanding and to give
adequate assurance to the companies as to the practice to be followed," 85
by requestirrg the filing of the administrative construction of this pro-
vision by the Commission itself which allowed retention in the account
of amounts deemed to represent a fair investment.8" This declaration
was accepted by the Court as "binding upon the Commission in its future
dealings with the companies," and as serving to distinguish the case
from New York Edison Co. v. Maltbie. In the words of the Court,
"the administrative construction now affixed to the contested order de-
vitalizes the objection that the difference between present value and
original cost is withdrawn from recognition as a legitimate investment."
It also removes the charge of arbitrariness on accotqnt of the otherwise
uncertain fate of any item. 7
83. The District Court (14 F. Supp. 121, 129) said: "What we say must not be
regarded as an endorsement of the indiscriminate exclusion of these expenses from the
rate base. (citing the Ohio case) Nor does it mean that expenses of stock flotations
subsequent to organization are always necessarily to be regarded as organization ex-
penses." The New York court, on the other hand, apparently interpreted the Ohio
Utilities case as holding that stock discount and expenses were "things of value" in-
cludible in a rate base and hence also in the property accounts. See p. 978 .suPra.
84. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 57 Sup. Ct. 170 (1936).
85. Id. at 174.
86. Cf. Provision in Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, Rc Uniform System
of Accounts for Class A and Class B Telephone Companies: 2-U-902 (Dec. 20, 1935)
87. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 57 Sup. Ct. 170 (1936).
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Paragraph 2 of the same interpretation answered the companies' second
objection that they were prevented from recovering depreciation expense
on their actual investment, and required to base depreciation charges on
cost to a prior owner. And although the provisions for writing off legiti-
mate amounts in the Acquisition Adjustment Account are called "amor-
tization." the "label is unimportant, whether depreciation or amortization,
if the substance of allowance is adequately preserved." 88
The companies objected, in the third place, to recording estimates of
cost which "mutilated" their accounts and exposed them to the risk of
criminal prosecution. But the Court pointed out that invalidation of
the accounting order on this ground would invalidate Section 213(c)
of the Federal Communications Act also."9 Estimates are necessary in
any accounting system. Although more estimates may be required in
the new system than in others, this does not make the Commission's
action unconstitutional. If the estimate is wrong, no substantial hazard
of criminal prosecution exists, as long as the mistake was innotent.
Finally, the companies objected to the original cost provisions because
of difficulty in determining the amounts to be written out of the Acqui-
sition Adjustment Account when the property is retired. To the Court,
this objection seemed insubstantial because the difficulty was no greater
than if only a single account had been used.
Company objections to the general instruction requiring "just and
reasonable" charges were shortly disposed of. After reciting that the
purpose of the instruction was to "prevent padding of the accounts by
charges knowingly and wilfully entered in excess of what is just and
reasonable," and that only knowing and wilful actions were subject to
penalty, the Court commented, with a suspicion of sarcasm: "There is
surely nothing arbitrary in establishing a standard of behaviour so con-
sistent with good morals. On the contrary, the need for such a standard
has been made manifest for years as the result of intercorporate rela-
tions that are matters of common knowledge." 90
The argument that the classification of plant between that used in
service and that held for future use was "so vague as to be arbitrary"
received no encouragement from the Court. "Property held in present
telephone use comes very near to defining itself." It includes spare plants
kept in reserve by "prudent administration." But if doubt arises, the
Commission can clarify.91
88. Id. at 176.
89. Id. at 176.
90. Id. at 177.
91. Id. at 177.
[Vol. 46: 955
UTILITY ACCOUNTING REGULATION
If generalization from these cases92 is permissible, it would seem that
a legislature can give a commission power to prescribe uniform account-
ing for utilities without fear of judicial interference on constitutional
grounds so long as the requirements do not amount to a taking
of property, or are not grossly at war with accounting principles and
experience. It may further empower a Commission to require separate
and uniform accounting of joint business not explicitly subject to its
regulation, and may require reports showing the extent and character
of such non-utility business. And it is permissible for it to choose among
conflicting accounting principles and practices those methods which in
its judgment best fit its needs for the performance of statutory duties.
A utility has no constitutional right to a particular method of account-
ing, and no taking of property results from a uniform system of ac-
counts as such. Accounting regulations so enacted are, moreover, admin-
istrative in character and no formal hearings or findings are necessary
before they are adopted in order to comply with the due process clause.
In sum total, at least so far as the Supreme Court of the United States
is concerned, a "hands-off" policy has been adopted with respect to
accounts regulation. And this rule of tolerance is strengthened-if not
enlarged-in the American Telephone and Telegraph Co. case. It is true
the Court apparently hesitated over the possibility that the Commission
might require a utility to write off legitimate investments in purchased
properties at a faster rate than under customary depreciation practices
or shift them to an account where the burden would fall on stockholders.
These doubts were, however, quickly resolved by the somewhat unusual
procedure of requesting an administrative construction without waiting
for a specific controversy over application of the rules. 3 Once fortified
in this way, the Court seemed to have no further qualms.
In some quarters the decision may be hailed as a famous "liberal"
victory for the effective regulation of utilities; and this view is justified,
in that the decision tends to strengthen regulation and administrative
discretion. But from the standpoint of accounting principle, the ruling
can be interpreted as "conservative." It upholds accounting standards
sanctioned by use among competent, independent public accountants. It
supports the principle that property accounts should be kept clean and
92. See also United States v. Atlanta B. & C. R. R., 282 U. S. 522 (1931) ; Atlanta
B. & C. R. R. v. United States, 296 U. S. 33 (1935) ; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. United
States, 5 F. Supp. 7 (E. D. Va. 1933).
93. While the Court served warning that the Commission would be held to its
construction, does this stop the Commission from changing its mind in the future?
If this should happen, and a specific controversy over the altered interpretation should
arise, would the Court still hold the Commission bound by its earlier interpretation?
In this event, administrative discretion would be circumscribed. (See 57 Sup. Ct. 170,
174).
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understandable, free from theories of appraising and from the values
of intangibles only remotely identifiable with physical property. Ac-
countants in long-established private industries not "affected with a
public interest" would not tolerate some of the practices of accounting
for property that are found frequently among utilities. The reason, I
think-, is that in the public utility field the pressure is strong to build
up a rate-base, as a foil against regulatory action, by showing large
property values, whereas in other industries the pressure of competition
usually encourages the writing-down of property.
If public utility managements believe that the property accounting
requirements of the new system of accounts are too harsh or too strict,
they might well ponder whether or not they themselves are largely
responsible for the present development. They were the ones who, seek-
ing constitutional protection against commission regulations, evoked
those judicial principles of valuation which have been a nightmare and
a handicap to effective regulation and which have helped to swerve many
utilities from conservative to inflationary property accounting. For these
reasons there was poetic justice in the district court's comment that the
new requirements were designed to make "readily available facts which
would tend to ea'pose discrcpancies in valuation" 94 and as such, were not
arbitrary.
The Supreme Court's opinion is expected to quiet the urge of electric
utilities to litigate their new accounting requirements. Probably in the
future when some commission has determined original cost and issues
instructions for recording and disposing of the excess, or if some com-
mission seeks to go beyond the boundaries approved by the Court. when
modifying and adopting the system of accounts within its own juris-
diction, further litigation may ensue. For the present and immediate
future, public utility accounting reform has apparently passed through
a period of litigation and enters a period of administrative application
and interpretation. On this level will be determined the real usefulness
of the new systems of accounts. Whether they successfully meet the
needs of commissions and investors can only be answered by the future.
94. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 121, 126 (S.D. N.Y.
1936).
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